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ABSTRACT 
 In 2017, two Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, USS John S. McCain and USS 
Fitzgerald, were each involved in collisions in the Pacific resulting in the deaths of 17 
Sailors and injuries to several others. During the Comprehensive Review (CR) of these 
incidents, it was determined that fatigue, poor watchstanding habits, and the lack of 
professional knowledge were contributing factors. Since the occurrence of these 
shattering events, the U.S. Navy has implemented policies which mandate the use of 
circadian-based watchbills and has equipped leaders with tools and best practices to 
effectively manage crew fatigue. Though these efforts are trending in the right direction, 
the Navy currently lacks the ability to determine the level of operational readiness of each 
Sailor onboard. This study aims to further develop the Scheduling Management Aid for 
Risk Tracking (SMART) tool by developing new heuristics to address the issues 
identified by the CR and exploring alternative methods of importing data into the tool. 
Following the redevelopment of the tool, the functionality of SMART will be evaluated. 
The overarching goal of this thesis is to provide Commanding Officers with a tool which 
allows them to visualize the readiness of their crew members to allow them to reduce 
unnecessary risk and exercise deliberate risk, particularly during special evolutions. 
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In 2017, four United States Navy warships were involved in mishaps at sea, 
resulting in the deaths of 17 sailors and injuries to several more. High operational tempo 
coupled with degraded operational readiness were contributing factors to these incidents. 
The motivation sparking this thesis stems from the surface community’s lack of a tool 
capable of determining a crew’s operational readiness, most notably in preparation of high-
risk special evolutions. 
This research aims to improve the prototype Scheduling Management Aid for Risk 
Tracking (SMART) tool first developed by Ana Veronica Badua in late 2020. The main 
efforts of this thesis include developing ten heuristics for inclusion into SMART’s 
algorithm and demonstrating the tool’s applicability in the surface fleet. The ten heuristics 
address three areas of concern in the surface community—fatigue, experience, and 
proficiency—and the overall health of a sailor. Four of the ten fatigue heuristics include 
analyzing the amount of sleep received in the previous 24-hour period, the sailor’s accrued 
sleep debt, the number of hours awake since the last sleep episode, and the time of day in 
which the special evolution is scheduled to occur. Four additional heuristics address gaps 
in training, experience, and proficiency. These heuristics include the sailor’s level of 
qualifications as it pertains to a particular watch station, the number of similar evolutions 
they have executed in the past three months, the cohesion of the watch team, and the status 
of the primary and secondary equipment. Lastly, two heuristics, medical and physical 
readiness, both contribute to the overall health of the sailor.  The criteria specific to each 
heuristic are derived from previous literature and validated research.   
Once SMART evaluates a sailor with respect to a given heuristic, each individual 
is assigned a value for that heuristic. The summation of these values for all ten heuristics 
produces the sailor’s overall risk assessment value. Overall risk assessment values are 
categorized into four risk ratings: minor, moderate, serious, and critical. When creating 
watchbills for special evolutions, the objective is to minimize risk by utilizing as many 
sailors in the minor risk rating as possible, while producing a watchbill capable of safely 
and efficiently completing the evolution.  Moreover, SMART can produce several different 
xviii 
visuals from line plots, bar graphs, and various tables to allow Commanding Officers to 
have a near-real-time snapshot of the operational readiness of their crew. Outputs of this 
tool allow Commanding Officers to minimize unnecessary risk, particularly during special 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Emergent tasking, lack of properly rested sailors, and the employment of unskilled 
personnel, potentially impact the readiness of United States (U.S.) naval ships. In an 
environment where risk is inevitable, commanders of warships do not have the opportunity 
to be fully risk adverse. The presence of a tool capable of providing the Commanding 
Officer (CO) with a snapshot as well as a thorough analysis of their ship’s overall 
operational readiness, in near real-time, could allow the CO to make timely decisions and 
exercise more deliberate risk.  
A. BACKGROUND  
In 2017, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, USS John S. McCain and the USS 
Fitzgerald, were both involved in collisions in the Pacific that resulted in the deaths of 17 
sailors and injuries to several other individuals. Additional surface catastrophes in 2017 
include USS Lake Champlain’s collision with a fishing vessel and the grounding of USS 
Antietam. In the aftermath of three deadly collisions and a grounding, the Vice Chief of 
Naval Operations (VCNO) directed a comprehensive review (CR) of mishaps between 
2007 and 2017 within the surface community. The commander of the United States Fleet 
Forces (USFF) led a team of 33 investigators through the execution of the review to 
determine which changes needed to be implemented to make the surface community safer 
and more efficient while at sea (Department of the Navy [DON], 2017). The findings from 
the review highlight poor watch team cohesion, lack of professional knowledge, and 
degraded human performance, specifically fatigue, as contributing factors to the four 
mishaps described above.  
In December 2020, the U.S. Navy released its updated Comprehensive Crew 
Endurance Management Policy. The purpose of this policy is to provide leaders with 
information to assist in managing fatigue, insufficient sleep, and other operational stressors 
generally experienced by sailors (Naval Surface Force [NSF], 2020). Two of the 
fundamental references used in the development of this policy are the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG) Crew Endurance Management Practices and the Naval Postgraduate School 
2 
(NPS) Crew Endurance Handbook. The USCG Crew Endurance Management Practices 
guidance was published in 2003 and continues to serve as a guide for maritime operations. 
This guide was established “to help maritime companies ensure the highest possible levels 
of performance and safety” (Lantz, 2003, p. v). The USCG established the Crew Endurance 
Management System (CEMS), which is a set of tools and best practices leaders in the 
maritime domain can leverage to effectively manage risk factors that can potentially reduce 
human performance and jeopardize safety. Secondly, the NPS Crew Endurance Handbook 
describes the importance of crew endurance and offers alternative watch rotation 
schedules, known as circadian-based watchbills. These watchbills have been validated 
through two decades of research conducted by the NPS Crew Endurance Team and appeal 
to sailor’s preferences and encourage increased crew performance.  
Numerous NPS alumnae directed their theses research towards determining the root 
causes of suboptimal sailor performance and developing tools and methods to address and 
improve crew endurance pitfalls. In 2020, Lieutenant Ana Veronica Badua focused her 
thesis on the development of the Scheduling Management Aid for Risk Tracking tool, 
commonly referred to as the SMART tool. Badua understood that to “improve crew 
endurance, warfighter performance, and operational effectiveness and safety, the U.S. 
Navy must invest in fatigue management tools and methods tailored to the military 
maritime environment” (Badua, 2020, p. 53). The SMART tool uses self-reported activity 
data to examine activity trends and risk trends for each sailor. In its prototype form, the 
tool provides users with insight regarding appropriate scheduling to mitigate known fatigue 
risk indicators (Badua, 2020).  
B. SCOPE & RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The overarching goal of this thesis is to advance the development of the SMART 
prototype and thereby provide commanding officers with a more advanced tool to eliminate 
or reduce unnecessary risk. This same tool would allow them to exercise deliberate risk 
while implementing the most appropriate mitigation factors. As such, in addition to the 
work and rest data used in the current version of SMART, this upgraded version of SMART 
will include data from Relational Administrative Data Management (RADM), Physical 
3 
Readiness Information Management System (PRIMS), Medical Readiness Reporting 
System (MRRS), and wearable technology to afford the CO and schedulers a more holistic 
assessment of the operational readiness of the crew.  
To achieve this goal, this thesis aims to address the following research objectives:  
1. Revise and develop new heuristics to target gaps in training and 
professional knowledge.  
2. Explore alternative methods of importing data into the tool.  
3. Demonstrate the improved functionality of SMART using data collected 
onboard an Arleigh-Burke class destroyer.  
C. THESIS OUTLINE  
Chapter I introduced the purpose of this research. Chapter II reviews relevant 
scientific literature necessary to assist in the improved development of SMART. Chapter 
III describes the process and data required to refine and derive new heuristics. Chapter IV 
showcases the functionality of the tool, and Chapter V discusses recommendations and 
offers direction for future efforts. 
   
4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides background on the origins of manpower and 
personnel determination onboard U.S. Navy (USN) Destroyers (DDG), discusses the 
employment of U.S. naval ships including operational tempo and personnel tempo, 
describes existing research on sleep and fatigue, and sheds insight on the SMART 
prototype.  
A. NATIONAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE  
Manpower requirements and personnel manning onboard U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke 
Class Destroyers find their origins in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National 
Defense Strategy (NDS). The National Security Strategy is published by the president and 
delivered to Congress. The purpose of the NSS is to ensure Congress is familiar with the 
president and Executive Branch’s national security vision. Once the NSS is released, it is 
used to guide the development of the NDS. The NDS is intended to provide clear guidance 
to the Department of Defense (DOD) to meet the challenges posed by near-peer 
competitors.  
B. MANPOWER & PERSONNEL  
When discussing manpower and personnel, there is a fundamental distinction that 
must be established between the two. The term “manpower” refers to the positions or billets 
required to satisfactorily perform a mission or task capability under certain conditions. 
Manpower requirements include the number of required billets at each Navy command. 
These requirements can be funded or unfunded. If a manpower requirement is funded, it 
represents a need to recruit, train, and distribute a qualified person into that position. In 
contrast, “personnel” represents the sailor to include knowledge, skills, and expertise 
needed to properly perform the work associated with those funded manpower 
requirements. Personnel also can be referred to as “personnel assigned” or “current 
onboard.”  
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The Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC), located in Millington, 
Tennessee, develops manpower requirements, to include Ship Manpower Documents 
(SMDs). NAVMAC’s initial step towards developing the SMD begins with the Required 
Operational Capability (ROC)/ Projected Operational Environment (POE). SMDs specify 
the manpower requirements necessary for the ship to satisfy the ROC/POE capability 
requirements. For each ship class, the Navy specifies the capabilities along with the 
associated operational environment in the ROC/POE (DON, 2020a). Industrial engineers 
then conduct workload studies based on the ROC/POE to calculate the minimum quantity, 
minimum grade, and minimum skills necessary to satisfy the work associated with the 
ROC/POE for that specific platform. The ROC/POE describes the ship class capability for 
specific missions and environments that support assigned missions of the NDS. The 
execution of these missions is eventually used to identify the number and type of personnel 
required per ship. These manpower requirements for each ship class are detailed in the 
SMD (DON, 2020a).  
In February 2016, Billet Based Distribution (BBD) in Career Management System-
Interactive Detailing (CMS-ID) replaced the legacy Enlisted Distribution Verification 
Report (EDVR) and became the new practice used to assign personnel to ships. “BBD will 
enable the Navy to more efficiently assign personnel in support of warfighting readiness 
and match sailors to specific billets based on rate, rating, and Navy Enlisted Classification 
(NEC)” (Navy Personnel Command Public Affairs, 2016).  
For surface ships, a disparity commonly exists between wartime requirements and 
billets authorized. This disparity is a result of budgetary decisions to take some risk in 
manpower requirements to fund higher priorities. Similarly, due to inefficiencies in the 
Navy’s personnel systems to recruit, train, and distribute sailors, the number of personnel 
assigned to a ship is not equal to the number and types of sailors onboard. Two metrics 
reflect a ship’s personnel readiness: FIT and FILL. FIT compares the skill and grade of the 
sailor to the requirement they are filling, whereas FILL represents the total number of 
sailors compared to the total number of requirements, regardless of skill or grade. The FIT/
FILL thresholds for most ships, set by Fleet Forces Command, are 90% and 95%, 
7 
respectively. Although these limits have been established, rarely are ships staffed to meet 
these thresholds, making it more difficult for units to execute their missions.  
C. EMPLOYMENT OF SURFACE FORCES  
The Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) applies to all USN forces and serves 
as the force readiness construct used to maximize the employment of forces (DON, 2020b). 
The OFRP is designed to heighten the benefits received from effective training and 
maintenance for a crew that is kept relatively intact during these phases. The notional 36-
month schedule as shown in Figure 1 includes the five phases of the OFRP cycle: 
Maintenance and Modernization, Basic Training Phase, Advanced Phase, Integrated Phase, 
and the Sustainment Phase.  
 
Figure 1. Notional 36-month OFRP schedule. Source: DON (2020b). 
The cycle commences with the Maintenance Phase and terminates at the beginning 
of the next maintenance phase. The Maintenance Phase is vital in improving the material 
readiness of the ship. During the Maintenance phase, ships undergo substantial repairs and 
upgrades. Although ships in the Maintenance Phase are typically not operational, units are 
still expected to complete certain inspections, certifications, and prepare for Basic Phase. 
Given the nonoperational status of the ship, the temporary assignment of personnel 
throughout this phase is a common practice. This process is used to fill a critical skill 
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shortage on a different ship and includes temporarily assigning sailors to an operational 
ship. One key benefit of this practice is that it potentially allows sailors to gain or maintain 
their proficiency. However, a major pitfall exists if sailors are temporarily assigned to ships 
where the equipment is different and proper training on the new equipment is absent. 
Similarly, if a ship is scheduled to receive substantial modernization, sailors should be 
required to undergo additional qualifications prior to operating the new equipment. A 
dedicated heuristic to address this gap in training and knowledge will be further discussed 
in Chapter III.  
Basic Phase is the next phase of the OFRP cycle. Now that the ship has returned to 
operation, the preliminary stages of Basic Phase require the ship’s crew to demonstrate 
proficiency and efficiency in rudimentary shipboard functions, such as combating damage 
control casualties, safely navigating the ship, and operating the ship’s combat suite; all of 
which are essential for the ship’s operational readiness. “The goals of this process are that 
sailors will be at peak [training] readiness when they deploy with their ship, they are 
properly prepared to overcome challenges presented on deployment, and they have the 
training to sustain a high level of readiness throughout deployment” (NSF, 2018, p. iv).  
Once a ship exits Basic Phase, it then transitions to the Advanced Phase. The 
Advanced Phase encourages watch team cohesion. This phase is intended to allow units to 
exhibit their skills as a cohesive unit in a simulated high stress and near-peer threat 
environment. Following the successful completion of the Advanced phase and as 
determined by projected future operations, some units may be required to complete the 
Integrated Phase. The Integrated Phase, if required, serves as additional training 
opportunities for the unit.  
The last phase in the cycle is the Sustainment Phase, and it is usually the longest 
phase in the OFPR cycle. Ships typically conduct their deployment in the Sustainment 
Phase. Once a ship completes her deployment, she will remain in the Sustainment Phase, 
conduct various assessments, and remain prepared to conduct any follow-on tasking as 
necessary. Once no further tasking is required, the ship will enter the Maintenance Phase, 
and the cycle repeats.  
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D. OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL TEMPO  
Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) measures the speed and intensity of mission 
requirements, whereas Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) measures the number of days 
each sailor spends away from their home port executing official Navy tasking. The OFRP, 
as described above, went into effect in October 2020, after the previous version underwent 
massive scrutiny in early 2020. Much of the scrutiny originated from the ship’s inability to 
exit the maintenance phase as scheduled. This delay means units currently operational are 
required to complete much more extensive tasking instead of entering their scheduled 
maintenance phase. In several instances, this has required ships to be “double pumped.” 
On July 18, 2021, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group (IKE CSG) 
returned to Naval Station Norfolk following the successful completion of two back-to-back 
deployments. Double pumping refers to a ship deploying twice during a 36-month period. 
Recall from the OFRP discussion, ships are notionally scheduled to deploy once during a 
36-month OFRP cycle. “Since USS Dwight D. Eisenhower left for its first deployment on 
February 20, 2020, the ship has been deployed for 320 of the last 514 days—not counting 
training exercises and restriction of movement periods that have kept sailors away from 
family and loved ones” (LaGrone, 2021, p. 1). In the case of IKECSG, both their 
OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO would be classified as high. Although this may appear to 
be an extreme case, this is not an isolated occurrence. Between 2012 and 2015, the USS 
John C. Stennis was deployed 15 out of the 24 months.  
High OPTEMPO results in deferred maintenance, which inadvertently reduces the 
life span of the ship. High PERSTEMPO affects the retention of sailors as they become 
demoralized and less motivated to accomplish tasks to the best of their abilities. The 
demanding and competing requirements of the USN, coupled with ships manned to levels 
less than what is required, increases a sailor’s workload, and introduces sleep deprivation 
and fatigue into an already high-risk environment.  
E. SLEEP IN THE SURFACE NAVY  
A ship’s ability to perform optimally is severely degraded when it is unable to 
receive proper manning to meet requirements and is further impacted as under-manned 
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crews experience long workdays and are denied opportunities to receive adequate rest. The 
following sections provide an overview of sleep, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
napping, discuss the relationship between sleep and immunity, and detail factors that lead 
to disrupted sleep while at sea.  
During a typical night of sleep, adults experience sleep in two states, non-rapid eye 
movement (NREM) and rapid eye movement (REM). A complete cycle of sleep includes 
the natural progression from the NREM stages to REM. According to the classic 
classification of sleep cycles, there are five stages of sleep (Dotto, 1996; Webb and Agnew, 
1970; Babloyantz et al., 1985; Doroshenkov et al., 2007) compared to an alternative 
definition that describes sleep occurring in only four stages (Patel et al., 2021; Kobayashi 
et al. 1999; Carskadon & Dement, 2011). 
Sleep begins in NREM (stages 1, 2, 3, and 4 using the classic definition, or stages 
N1, N2, and N3 in the alternative definition) and then transitions to REM sleep. Scientists 
categorize these stages based on the state of the brain and body while asleep. As individuals 
fall asleep, they enter the early stages of NREM where their heart rate and breathing slow, 
body temperature drops, and brain activity becomes normal. As they transition into later 
stages of NREM where they enter deep sleep. During deep sleep, it is difficult for the 
individual to be awakened. Lastly, the transition to REM. During REM sleep, the body is 
motionless, and this is the stage most associated with dreaming.  
Although obtaining proper sleep is vital, many adults do not receive enough sleep 
at night. In such cases, short periods of sleep during the day can replace regular nocturnal 
sleep (Naitoh et al., 1987). Naps which are short in duration, approximately 20 to 30 
minutes, have shown restorative effects after a restricted night’s sleep (Gillberg et al., 
1996) and can lead to increased alertness (Lumley et al., 1986; Gillberg et al., 1996). 
Depending on the reason and usage of the nap, it is classified into one of three 
categories: preventative, operational maintenance, and operational recovery. In some 
cases, one may not be feeling fatigued but will choose to take a nap in preparation for an 
event. This type of nap is called a preventive nap. Operational maintenance naps are 
deliberately taken before extreme sleepiness and fatigue. Furthermore, operational 
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recovery naps are taken after sleep deprivation and fatigue have occurred (Buxton & 
Hartley, 2001). It is best to take a nap before the effects of sleep deprivation and increased 
levels of fatigue are experienced.  
Napping can be used to mitigate the effects of performance impairment, yet it 
cannot be used to entirely relieve the effects of sleep deprivation. Two major disadvantages 
of napping are firstly the possibility of the nap being ineffective if serious fatigue has 
already set in, and secondly, a period typically observed immediately following a nap 
consisting of unsteadiness, which can negatively impact performance and alertness 
(Buxton & Hartley, 2001). This period is known as sleep inertia.  
Over decades of research, sailors onboard U.S. ships have been shown to receive 
inadequate sleep and rest (Shattuck et al., 2014a). Figure 2 describes the leading categories 
of factors that interfere with sailors receiving proper sleep: Psychological-
Pharmacological, Environmental, Berthing Habitability and Organization (Shattuck & 
Matsangas, 2017).  
  
Figure 2. Factors leading to disrupted sleep at sea. Source: Shattuck & 
Matsangas (2017). 
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Among other components, psychological-pharmacological factors include the use 
of caffeine and nicotine. Given caffeine’s convenience in coffee, tea, soft drinks, candy 
bars, and even over-the-counter drugs, it has become one of the most widely used and 
distributed psychoactive substances in the world (Roehrs & Roth., 2008). Laboratory 
studies have indicated that caffeine could improve attention and reaction time performance 
(Roehrs & Roth, 2008) and sustain performance while in sleep-deprived and sleep-
restricted environments (Drake et al., 2008). Yet, consuming an unhealthy amount of 
caffeine can substantially affect one’s sleep. Numerous studies have evaluated the sleep 
effects of caffeine consumed within one hour of sleep. Studies have shown that caffeine 
can make it more difficult to fall asleep, and once finally asleep, caffeine can make one 
sleep lighter making it easier to be awakened (Roehers et al., 2008). Nicotine is also a 
stimulant that can impede sleep. Cigarette smokers are more likely to report issues of 
falling asleep, staying asleep, and daytime sleepiness (Phillips et al, 1995). Additionally, 
cigarette smoking has been identified as a contributing factor for snoring (Partinen et al., 
1992) which in turn could also impose as a noise disturbance within the berthing 
compartment.  
One environmental factor contributing to disrupted sleep is the motion of the ship. 
Brown (2012) investigated the effects of motion on the work and rest patterns onboard U.S. 
naval vessels. Based on her research, she determined that motion onboard ships and sleep 
quality are inversely related. That is, a sailor’s sleep quality decreases as the ship’s motion 
increases. Given the inexorable nature of weather and sea states, Brown recommended 
improving sleep quality by “improving habitability through a ship hull and berthing 
compartment sleeping redesign to reduce the motion effects felt by passengers” (Brown, 
2012, p. 65).  
Concerning berthing compartment habitability, the Crew Endurance team at NPS 
conducted a study onboard an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer to address issues within the 
berthing spaces. The study examined the sleep patterns of sailors using the standard rack 
curtains for one week followed by one week with substantially thicker curtains. The thicker 
curtains were aimed to minimize light infiltration, provide an additional layer of privacy, 
and minimize noise heard inside the rack. Their research concluded that using the thicker, 
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enhanced curtains “reduced average daytime sleepiness and severity of insomnia 
symptoms” (Matsangas et al, 2021, p. A116). The study further cautioned that although 
their sleep improved, the temperature inside the rack was elevated with the enhanced rack 
curtains. This is a finding of concern if we consider that temperature can be an 
environmental factor leading to disrupted sleep (Figure 2).  
Irregular sleep schedules and watch rotations are organizational factors hindering 
the quality of sleep while at sea. Many studies have presented evidence that rotational 
watches have severe effects on 24-hour rhythms, specifically their sleep cycle (Czeisler et 
al., 1982). “A substantial percentage of shift workers develop shift work disorder, a 
circadian rhythm disorder characterized by excessive sleepiness, insomnia, or both as a 
result of shift work” (Wickwire et al., 2017). The 24/7 demand of operations while at sea, 
makes shift work inevitable. Implementing fixed (“circadian-based”) watchbills on naval 
ships, however, has shown to greatly improve the effectiveness and alertness of sailors.  
F. CIRCADIAN-BASED WATCHBILLS  
Extensive research conducted by the NPS Crew Endurance Team has demonstrated 
the benefits of implementing circadian-based watchbills (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2015a; 
Shattuck & Matsangas, 2015b; Shattuck et al., 2015c; Shattuck et al., 2014b). Circadian-
based watchbills are an important principle of effectively managing crew endurance, as 
they are used to align a sailor’s work and rest schedule with a 24-hour day. Such watchbills 
support sailors standing watch, working, eating, and resting approximately around the same 
time each day. Through decades of research, circadian-based watchbills have demonstrated 
their value by encouraging more alertness and increased performance among sailors 
(Shattuck, 2017).  
In late 2017, U.S. Navy leadership directed all surface vessels to create and execute 
a schedule that allows each sailor at least seven hours of uninterrupted sleep. In addition to 
these sleep periods being uninterrupted, the policy mandated that the sleep periods occur 
around the same time each day. Furthermore, this policy grants commands the flexibility 
to implement these watchbills as they saw most appropriate. Figure 3 offers a list of 
common shipboard watch rotations.  
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Figure 3. Common watch rotations. Source: NPS Crew Endurance 
Handbook.  
One of the leading factors driving the employment of these watchbills is the number 
of sections the ship can sustain. This number is determined by the number of qualified and 
competent watchstanders for each watch station. Generally, large watch sections with 
fewer hours spent on watch is desired.  
In late 2020, three years following the mandatory application of circadian 
watchbills, Navy leadership published follow-on guidance via the Comprehensive Crew 
Endurance Management Policy (CCEMP). The purpose of this policy is to further educate 
the Surface Force (SURFOR) community on the importance of managing fatigue, the 
effects of insufficient sleep, and other operational stressors that may be present (NSF, 
2020). Although the implementation of circadian watchbills is highly desired, the ship’s 
daily schedule must also align with the watchbills. If the ship’s routine does not support 
the watchbills, and vice versa, this will render the watchbills ineffective – preventing the 
crew from reaping the benefits of improved crew endurance.  
15 
G. TIME OF DAY EFFECT  
Cognitive performance varies throughout the day. Distinctive cognitive functions 
display prime performance at different times of the day; this is known as the “time-of-day 
effect” (Barner et al., 2019). “Attention is a cognitive process crucial for human 
performance” (Valdez, 2019, p. 81) There are four factors of attention: tonic alertness, 
phasic alertness, selective attention, and sustained attention (Valdez, 2019, p. 83). When 
investigating these four components, “they reach their lowest levels during nighttime and 
early hours in the morning, better levels around noon, and the highest levels during the 
afternoon and evening hours” (Valdez, 2019, p. 81). Other fundamental cognitive functions 
such as one’s working memory, follow the same pattern as attention.  
Figure 4 contains a line plot of the relative risk of motor vehicles as it relates to the 
time of day. Additionally, Figure 4 contains six observation points representing major 
accidents and their corresponding time of occurrence. From these six points, it can be 
observed that they all occur during times of peak risk. Furthermore, these times correspond 
with increased circadian sleepiness (George, 2004). Lastly, from Figure 4 an increase in 
risk occurs around mid-day. This is likely attributable to the “post-lunch drip”. Post-lunch 
impairments have been observed in the workforce (Bjerner and Svensson, 1953; 
Hildebrandt et al., 1974) and during laboratory studies (Blake, 1971; Craig et al., 1981). 
As such, schedulers should be aware of this phenomenon when scheduling sailors 
immediately following lunchtime.  
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Figure 4. Time of day and major accidents timeline. Shattuck, N.L. (2020).  
H. FATIGUE RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS  
Sleep researchers make a distinction between sleepiness and fatigue. In general, 
sleepiness usually signals an increased likelihood to fall asleep or doze off, whereas fatigue 
can be described as a feeling of tiredness or exhaustion (Shahid et al., 2010; Mullins et al., 
2014). Additionally, sleepiness is usually resolved with sufficient sleep; however, this fact 
is not always true for cases of fatigue. Fatigue can come in the form of physical fatigue or 
mental fatigue. Physical fatigue occurs following extended periods of physical activity, 
whereas mental fatigue takes place because of mental stress or mental exhaustion (Jepsen 
et al., 2015). To assess a sailor’s level of fatigue and anticipate performance, sleep experts 
have developed fatigue risk models.  
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1. Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) Model  
One of the leading biomathematical fatigue models is the Sleep Activity Fatigue 
and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) model. The SAFTE Model was developed by Dr. Steven 
Hursh and colleagues based on research conducted at the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research at the U.S. Army Medical Research Development Command. SAFTE is 
extensively accepted and adopted by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
DOD. This model uses circadian rhythms, cognitive performance recovery and decay rates 
associated with sleep and wakefulness, and cognitive performance outcomes linked with 
sleep inertia to assess how the time of day and sleep-rest repetitions impact cognitive ability 
and the possibility of performance mistakes (Hursh, 2003).  
SAFTE uses quantifiable information concerning cognitive performance recovery 
rates, circadian rhythms in metabolic rate, and cognitive performance effects as they relate 
to inertia to complete its model on human cognitive effectiveness (Hursh, 2003). The 
general design of the model is captured in Figure 5. Circadian processes impact cognitive 
effectiveness and sleep regulation. Sleep regulation itself is determined by the hours of 
sleep, time spent awake, current sleep debt, the circadian process, and the number of times 
one awakes during sleep (Hursh, 2003).  
 
Figure 5. General schematic of the architecture of SAFTE. Source: Hursh 
(2003).  
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The robustness and performance of this model were demonstrated during a DOT 
and DOD model comparison conference. The world’s six best fatigue models were chosen 
to predict the outcome of four scenarios. “The SAFTE model had less error than any model 
tested and was combined with a convenient and logical user interface, the Fatigue 
Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST)” (Hursh et al., 2004, p. 5).  
2. Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST)  
FAST was developed by the U.S. Air Force and was designed to provide schedulers 
with a computerized tool to allow them to predict performance for up to three weeks based 
on individual or a team’s prior sleep history during the period (Hursh et al., 2004). FAST 
is designed to predict fatigue, not the number of incidents or accidents. Figure 6 shows an 
individual’s performance based on sleep and time spent on duty. The main window 
includes two smaller frames. The upper frame displays FAST’s predicted performance 
based on actual sleep, and the lower frame shows the potential of improved performance if 
the individual receives more sleep during periods they are not on duty (Hursh et al., 2004). 
From the two frames it can be observed that in the case where the individual received more 




Figure 6. Sample FAST results. Source: Hursh (2004).  
For military applications, “FAST has been used to validate the use of in-flight naps 
to maintain performance of Air Force bomber crews conducting 30- and 45-hour missions 
and to guide the design of night training exercises” (Hursh et al., 2004). The benefits of 
FAST were also used by the NPS Crew Endurance Team to compare the performance of 
the 3/9 versus 5/10 watchbills. FAST was used to cross-validate the effectiveness of using 
3/9 watch rotations compared to the 5/10 watch rotation. Currently FAST does not allow 
its users to account for various working conditions typically experienced in maritime 
environments.  
3. Optimized Watchbill and Logistics Fatigue Meter (OWL FM)  
The Optimized Watchbill and Logistics Fatigue Meter (OWL FM) was developed 
by Pulsar Informatics Incorporation and was designed to support watchbill scheduling, 
fatigue assessments within the watchbill, and provide users with a dashboard to perform 
fatigue analysis. Key inputs used to support the watchbill scheduling function include using 
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the ship’s routine on a daily and weekly basis, on-duty time, and fatigue (Mollicone & 
Bruneau, 2018).  
Developers at Pulsar Informatics Inc. collaborated with the Naval Submarine 
Medical Research Laboratory (NSMRL) to develop the interface of the dashboard to 
provide users with fatigue information. Using this dashboard, fatigue assessments within 
the watchbill are easily observed, as shown in Figure 7. From the dashboard, an 
individual’s time on duty is represented by the gray bars, their sleep estimates are the blue 
bars, and the numerical values to the far right represent the fatigue scores. Fatigue scores 
were derived from an external biomathematical model as described by Dr. Peter McCauley 
(2013). Essentially, total or partial sleep deprivation, the occurrence of naps, shift work, 
night work, and partial sleep deprivation episodes followed by recovery periods shape the 
calculation of the model’s fatigue score. Additionally, the dashboard provides the number 
of duty events, average sleep, the average level of fatigue, and the individual’s highest level 
of fatigue (Mollicone & Bruneau, 2018). 
 
Figure 7. Snapshot of the OWL FM dashboard. Source: (Mollicone & 
Bruneau, 2018)  
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OWL FM uses a database that contains a repository of historical information 
surrounding each person’s work and rest pattern. This repository allows for more accurate 
analysis, as people are each compared to their past performance versus using group 
averages (Mollicone & Bruneau, 2018). Although this tool was designed for sailors 
onboard submarines, one could argue that the model could be adapted for sailors onboard 
surface ships. However, one major disadvantage of OWL FM is the requirement for web 
services to enjoy its full suite of benefits.  
I. HEURISTICS  
“In the history of science, we find attempts to formulate methods for finding proofs 
and for arriving at new discoveries. They belong to what was sometimes called the art of 
discovery, or later, heuristics” (Groner et al., 2014, p. 1). Although not explicitly stated, 
the fatigue risk models previously discussed each contain a functioning set of heuristics 
validated through research. A heuristic can be thought of as a rule of thumb. For instance, 
the amount of sleep an adult should receive each night is a heuristic. An immense amount 
of independent research harmonizes with the joint consensus statement of the American 
Academy of Sleep Medicine and Sleep Research Society which recommends that “adults 
should sleep seven or more hours per night on a regular basis to promote optimal health” 
(Watson et al., 2015, p. 843).  
Heuristics can serve as a strategy to provide solutions when optimization is not 
available or applicable (Engel & Gigerenzer, 2006). Gigerenzer and colleagues (1999) 
define fast and frugal. 
Heuristics are task-specific decision techniques that are part of a decision maker’s 
collection of cognitive strategies to solve decision tasks. Fast and frugal heuristics are 
simple to execute and do not require an extensive amount of computation.  
Critics may argue that fast and frugal heuristics are too simple. Figure 8 is a fast 
and frugal tree Green and Mehr (1997) created to address the issue of overcrowding in an 
intensive care unit (ICU) in a Michigan hospital. Overcrowding was largely due to the 
medical staff conservatively admitting patients to the ICU. Through the design of a 
heuristic, Green and Mehr designed a fast and frugal tree, “which was more accurate in 
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predicting heart attacks than were a complex logistic regression system and the physicians’ 
decisions” (Gigerenzer, 2008).  
 
Figure 8. Fast and frugal trees for coronary care unit allocation. Source: 
Green & Mehr (1997).  
Another important facet of using heuristics includes the development of criteria. 
Returning to the example of the joint consensus on the suggested amount of sleep needed 
for adults, it is recommended that at least seven hours of sleep for adults be received. The 
publication then goes on to discuss the adverse health effects of sleeping less than seven 
hours or greater than nine hours. Table 1 shows three different levels of criteria for the 
heuristic describing the amount of sleep for adults. In this example, the ranges of sleep are 
less than seven, seven to nine, and greater than nine.  
Table 1. Daily sleep duration heuristic with three levels of criteria. Adopted 




As discussed in this section, heuristics can be a powerful tool. In a setting where 
improving crew endurance and optimizing crew readiness are the main objectives, the use 
of heuristics becomes instrumental in determining a sailor’s level of fatigue, proficiency in 
training, and depth of professional knowledge. Specific heuristics to address these issues 
will be discussed in Chapter III.  
J. SCHEDULING MANAGEMENT AID FOR RISK TRACKING (SMART) 
TOOL 
The SMART tool was initially developed by an Operations Research Department 
student at the Naval Postgraduate School, LT Ana Veronica Badua. As a Surface Warfare 
Officer in the U.S. Navy, Badua saw first-hand the effects of fatigue on sailors’ 
performance and knew a “diagnostic tool capable of assessing crew work and rest patterns 
to mitigate fatigue” (Badua, 2020) was necessary.  
Built in Microsoft® Excel, the prototype SMART tool can provide end-users with 
visual trend analysis and human performance risk assessment data (Badua, 2020). Figure 
9 is a concept map that details the inputs, outputs, and constraints of the SMART tool. The 
inputs into the tool are maintenance (M), watch hours (W), work hours (A), and sleep or 
rest hours (S). Once the inputs are properly entered, the tool provides users with activity 
average trends, activity summary reports, a list of individuals sorted by risk category or 
value, and risk level trends. These output statements assist leadership with properly 
scheduling personnel and managing a sailor’s workload.  
24 
 
Figure 9. SMART tool concept map. Source: Badua (2020).  
Human performance risk assessment data were derived using heuristics. The 
heuristics embedded within SMART are a collection of best practices as observed through 
DOD policies and scientific research. Figure 10 lists the Activity Heuristics and their 
associated criteria currently implemented in the tool. SMART is also equipped with two 
databases, one dedicated to storing sailors’ activity throughout a day and the second to 
store personnel data. Referring again to Figure 10, once all data have been entered, the tool 
then computes the sailor’s individual risk level. For example, a sailor receiving 5 hours of 
rest/sleep equates to a Risk Assessment Value (RAV) of 2; spending 12 hours at work 
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(RAV of 1) on a rotating (RAV of 1) 3-section watch (RAV 1) implies this sailor has an 
overall risk value of 5, indicating a serious risk rating. This information prompts schedulers 
to implement measures to lower this individual’s risk level.  
 
Figure 10. SMART tool heuristics. Source: Badua (2020).  
The assumptions used during the development of the prototype (Badua, 2020) are 
listed below:  
• Sleep/rest times are only demonstrative of opportunities for sleep or rest.  
• The ship implemented either circadian (i.e., fixed) or non-circadian (i.e., 
rotating) based watchbills while the ship was underway.  
• Watchstanders did not deviate from the approved watchbill.  
• Changes to the notional schedule represent planned and unplanned events 
that alter a sailor’s time to work and rest.  
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• Events occurring daily in the ship’s routine were designed as Working 
Hours (A). Such events include cleaning stations, training, and messing.  
• Sailors were previously qualified to stand their watch and perform 
maintenance as required. 
• The scheduled events used are an accurate illustration of a warship’s daily 
routine. 
The original intent of this thesis was to survey an actual crew from a U.S. Navy 
destroyer. However, the COVID-19 pandemic posed a significant limitation on our ability 
to collect data. Therefore, the functionality of the newly revised SMART tool was assessed 
by using notional data of a crew of a USN destroyer. Table 2 provides the results of the 
functionality evaluation. The tool rendered a “yes” or “no” based on the satisfactory 
attainment of the evaluation factor. From Table 2, it can be observed that SMART met all 
functioning criteria. Despite SMART’s ability to provide its users and schedulers with 
marginal insights into the level of readiness of their sailors, the tool lacked the ability to 
address the gaps in training and professional knowledge, which were identified in the 2017 
comprehensive review. Furthermore, the use of additional heuristics within the tool could 
provide a more accurate depiction of a sailor’s operational readiness.  
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To summarize, this review sets the stage to further develop the SMART tool for the 
U.S. Navy. If commands continue to be under-manned and the number of requirements 
continues to increase, it is imperative that commands understand the fatigue levels of their 
crewmembers, so that risk can be properly managed. Failure to properly manage risk not 
only jeopardizes the mission, but also the safety of the crew.  
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III. ADVANCES IN THE SMART TOOL DEVELOPMENT  
This chapter provides the background and rationale for the selection of the 
heuristics to be embedded within SMART. Following the identification of scientifically 
validated heuristics, criteria tailored to sailors onboard U.S. Navy warships are developed 
and integrated into the scheduling tool. Using data from external sources such as Relational 
Administrative Data Management (RADM), Physical Readiness Information Management 
System (PRIMS), Medical Readiness Reporting System (MRRS), and wearable 
technology, data are imported into SMART’s algorithm to provide a risk assessment for 
each sailor. Following SMART’s risk assessment of the crew, the CO and schedulers can 
visualize the operational readiness of their crew.  
A. INPUTS  
This section offers background on the various sources of external data used within 
SMART. Each sub-section details the name of the system and the background concerning 
its usability. Table 3 provides the input sources and the ten heuristics that have been 
identified. 
Table 3. Inputs and heuristics 





Time of Day 
Relational Administrative  
Management System (RADM) 
Number of Evolutions 
Qualification Status 
Watch Team Cohesion 
User Entered Equipment Status 
Physical Readiness Information Management 
System (PRIMS) 
Physical Readiness 
Medical Readiness Reporting System (MRRS) Medical Readiness 
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1. Wearable Technology  
The increased use of wearable technology provides new avenues to collect 
objective physiological data from the sailor. Wearable technology and wearable devices, 
commonly referred to as “wearables,” are a category of electronic devices that can be 
integrated into clothing or worn as accessories (Wright & Keith, 2014). These technologies 
have the greatest influence in sectors such as health, medicine, and fitness (Wright & Keith, 
2014). In healthcare fields, wearables can be used to track a patient’s behavior, such as 
sleep patterns, as it relates to disease progression or treatment over time (de Zambotti et 
al., 2016).  
Two common forms of wearable technology approved for sleep studies in secure 
spaces are wrist-worn actigraphs and ŌURA rings. An example of a wrist-worn actigraph 
is the Actiwatch Spectrum from Philips Respironics. Using accelerometers, this device can 
record body movements to assist in determining periods of rest or wakefulness (Philips 
Respironics, 2019). The ŌURA ring measures and processes information gathered from 
the user’s biosignals (de Zambotti et al., 2017). Preliminary research has provided evidence 
suggesting the Ōura ring can discriminate between the different phases of sleep (de 
Zambotti et al., 2017).  
2. Relational Administrative Data Management (RADM)  
The Relational Administrative Data Management (RADM) is an automated 
tracking system used for the management of personnel information. The main functions of 
RADM applicable to this thesis include management of training records, creating, and 
submitting muster reports, personnel qualification standards (PQS), and generating 
watchbills. The heuristic concerning the number of evolutions the sailor has executed in 
the previous three months will receive information from the RADM watchbill repository. 
Once a watchbill is created, it is then routed for approval by the CO. Once approved, the 
watchbill goes into effect. Additionally, the qualification status will receive input from the 
sailor’s training record. Using RADM’s training function, supervisors can assign Personnel 
Qualification Standards (PQS) and track a sailor’s progress towards attaining the 
qualification. RADM recognizes four stages of qualification status: Not Qualified (NQ), 
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Under Instruction (U/I), Interim Qualified (I), and Qualified (Q). RADM prohibits sailors 
from being assigned a watch station if they are not either Interim Qualified or Qualified. 
This logic ensures only qualified persons are assigned a watch station. 
3. Physical Readiness Information System (PRIMS)  
In the March 2021 guidance for the Physical Readiness Test (PRT), it is described 
as a method to provide COs “with a means of assessing the general fitness of sailors of 
their command.” The PRT consists of three measures of fitness to evaluate aerobic capacity 
or cardio-respiratory endurance, muscular strength, and muscular endurance (Navy 
Physical Readiness Program [NPRP] Guide 5, 2021). Nearly all sailors are administered 
the physical test on a semi-annual basis, yet certain conditions may preclude a sailor from 
participating to include pregnancy, injuries, or other medical conditions. In many cases, 
even if a sailor is exempt from the PRT, they may still be required to complete a Body 
Composition Assessment (BCA). Upon completion of the PRT and/or the BCA, Command 
Fitness Leaders (CFLs) record fitness data into the Navy’s PRIMS. Using PRIMS, sailors 
can view previous fitness scores and BCA status.  
4. Medical Readiness Reporting System (MRRS)  
Medical Readiness Reporting System (MRRS) is the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Coast Guard’s web-based tool designed to record and track Individual Medical Readiness 
(IMR). According to the website for the Military Health System, “IMR status includes 
immunizations, dental status, laboratory tests, periodic health assessments, deployment 
health status, illness, and injuries” (2021). MRRS provides COs a real-time snapshot of 
their crew’s medical readiness and immunization status (Military Health System, 2021).  
B. HEURISTICS  
As described in Chapter I Section A, one of the conclusions from the 2017 CR is 
that in each of the four incidents there were gaps in training, proficiency, experience, and 
professional knowledge. Heuristics for this advanced version of SMART are deliberately 
developed to bridge these gaps. The following section provides ten heuristics organized 
into three different categories: fatigue, experience, and health. Each subsection includes 
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the name of the heuristic, the criteria, and the rationale for the selection of the heuristic and 
its corresponding criteria.  
1. Fatigue Considerations  
The following section outlines the three fatigue considerations, namely the amount 
of sleep received in the previous 24-hour period, cumulative sleep debt, and hours awake.   
a. Sleep (in the previous 24-hour period)  
Table 4 includes the criteria for the sleep and rest heuristic. As discussed in the joint 
consensus article by Watson and colleagues (2015), the recommended amount of sleep 
adults should receive per night is at least seven hours. As such, if a sailor receives at least 
seven hours of sleep, their risk assessment value is nil. Although the joint consensus also 
cautions sleeping more than nine hours per night on a consistent basis could have negative 
impacts on one’s health, sailors are not penalized if they met or exceeded this threshold. 
However, fewer hours of rest and sleep within a 24-hour period results in an increased risk 
assessment.  
Table 4. Sleep/rest heuristic 
Sleep/Rest (in last 24 hours) Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Wearable Technology 
  Sleep/Rest Hours ≤ 5 3 
5 < Sleep/Rest Hours ≤ 6 2 
6 < Sleep/Rest Hours < 7 1 
  Sleep/Rest Hours ≥ 7 0 
 
b. Sleep Debt  
One approach to determine sleep debt is to examine the total number of hours of 
sleep that have been missed since the last occurrence of sufficient sleep. Chronic sleep debt 
is experienced when an individual receives inadequate sleep over several consecutive days 
(Van Dongen et al., 2003). Alternatively, Hardaway and Gregory (2005) evaluated sleep 
debt by comparing the amount of sleep received by each pilot over a period of 10 days to 
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80 hours, assuming each pilot needs eight hours of sleep per night for ten nights. SMART 
adopts the second approach to define sleep debt. For instance, instead of a sailor receiving 
seven hours of sleep, if they only receive four, their current sleep debt is three hours, 
resulting in a risk assessment value of one as shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Sleep debt heuristic  
Sleep Debt Risk Assessment 
Value 
Using: Wearable Technology 
  Sleep Debt ≥ 6 3 
4 < Sleep Debt < 6 2 
2 < Sleep Debt ≤ 4 1 
  Sleep Debt ≤ 2 0 
 
c. Hours Awake  
As the time spent awake increases, performance deteriorates and alertness 
decreases (Dijk et al, 1992). Even relatively alert, yet fatigued, individuals have a much 
slower reaction time compared to those not fatigued (Humphrey et al., 1994). This 
unfavorable result occurs throughout the entire sample of reaction time trials as the reaction 
time distribution becomes slower with extended wakefulness (Kjellberg, 1977; Lisper & 
Kjellberg, 1972).  
Generally, performance of individuals remaining awake for periods of 18 hours or 
greater is degraded (Dijk et al, 1992); hence, the criteria initially hinge on 18 hours. As the 
sailor experiences further hours of wakefulness, the risk assessment value also increases, 
as shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. Hours awake heuristic  
Hours Awake Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Wearable Technology 
  Hours Awake ≥ 22 3 
20 < Hours Awake < 22 2 
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Hours Awake Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Wearable Technology 
18 ≤ Hours Awake ≤ 20 1 
  Hours Awake < 18 0 
 
d. Time of Day  
The time of day in which the special evolution is set to occur determines the 
sailor’s performance within this heuristic. As technological advances in wearables 
are made, this heuristic will eventually be able to compare the time of day in which 
a ship evolution will occur as it relates to the sailor’s sleep and wake pattern. As an 
example, let’s say an individual is standing watch somewhere in the engineering 
department, where the presence or absence of daylight is not a factor. If the sailor 
is used to working 0100-0400 and the evolution is set to occur at 0100, the sailor 
would not be penalized, since the special evolution aligns with their watch 
schedule. In the event a sailor is penalized, Table 7 shows the associated risk 
assessment value. 
Table 7. Time of day heuristic 
Time of Day Risk Assessment 
Value Using: User Input 
2000 < Time of Day ≤ 0700 3 
1900 < Time of Day ≤ 2000 2 
1800 < Time of Day ≤ 1900 1 
0700 < Time of Day ≤ 1800 0 
 
2. Experience/Proficiency Considerations  
The four experience and proficiency considerations include the sailor’s 
qualification status, the number of similar evolutions they have completed in the last three 
months, the status of their equipment used during their watch, and the cohesion of their 
watch team.  
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a. Qualification Status  
As outlined by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in OPNAV Instruction 
3500.34, “the Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) program ensures personnel 
demonstrates required competencies prior to performing specific duties. PQS delineates 
the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities that an individual must demonstrate before 
standing watches or performing other specific duties” (p. 1). Once a sailor has satisfactorily 
completed all requirements for qualification, they are assigned a “Q” in RADM. However, 
Interim qualifications (“I”) are granted by the CO on a case-by-case temporary basis. It is 
the CO’s discretion to determine the minimum qualifications of each watch station to 
ensure safe operation. Those interim qualified should make every effort to receive their 
final qualification as expeditiously as possible, typically not to exceed six months.  
Moreover, proper training should be administered to sailors who have been 
temporarily assigned to a different ship. In the case of the USS John S. McCain mishap, 
three of the watchstanders on the bridge during the collision were temporarily assigned 
from another ship and were qualified without receiving proper training on the differences 
in the equipment on the two ships (DON, 2017). Had they received proper training and 
undergone requalification events, this mishap may have been prevented. Table 8 provides 
the risk assessment values associated with the qualification status heuristic. 
Table 8. Qualification status heuristic  
Qualification Status Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Relational Admin 
Requalification in progress 3 
Interim Qualified (Initial Qualification) 2 
Interim Qualified (Requalification) 1 
Fully Qualified 0 
b. Number of Evolutions  
The review of the four 2017 mishaps revealed that although the watchstanders were 
“qualified” in RADM, this qualification status did not equate to proficiency (DON, 2017). 
As a result, this research developed another heuristic to address the gaps in experience and 
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proficiency. Once a sailor earns their qualification, this heuristic encourages them to gain 
more experience and proficiency to decrease their risk rating. These risk ratings are found 
in Table 9.  
Table 9. Number of evolutions 
Experience/Proficiency Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Relational Admin 
  Number of Similar Evolutions ≤ 1 3 
1 < Number of Similar Evolutions ≤ 3 2 
3 < Number of Similar Evolutions < 5 1 
  Number of Similar Evolutions ≥ 5 0 
 
c. Equipment Status  
Primary and secondary equipment onboard is used to maintain situational 
awareness and to operate the ship safely and efficiently. The status of primary and 
secondary equipment should be tracked in a systematic manner; each off-going watch 
section should inform the oncoming watchstanders of each equipment’s status. Appropriate 
documentation should accompany all equipment degradations. When appropriate, 
equipment status boards (ESBs) should be used and posted in conspicuous locations. ESBs 
list all primary and secondary equipment and its current performance status. If equipment 
is degraded or out of commission (OOC), the ESB could serve as a visual cue to routinely 
check the status of the repair. The criteria for equipment status ranges from all equipment 
being fully operational—the lowest risk value—to a primary or secondary equipment being 
OOC which is assigned the highest risk value, see Table 10.  
Table 10. Equipment status heuristic 
Equipment Status Risk Assessment 
Value Using: User Input 
Primary or Secondary Equipment 
Out of Commission 
3 
Moderate Degradation 2 
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Equipment Status Risk Assessment 
Value Using: User Input 
Slight Degradation 1 
All Equipment is fully operational 0 
 
d. Watch Team Cohesion  
Working together as a team is essential for effective and increased performance 
(Salas, 2015). However, measuring team cohesion is difficult. In many cases, 
predominantly in the surface community, teams are preferred over individuals working 
independently. Diverse knowledge, experience, and thinking allow problems to be solved 
with a creative approach. This heuristic aims to provide an objective approach to measure 
watch team cohesion. If the sailor is part of the ship’s company and previously participated 
in a team-enriching event, the sailor will receive a risk assessment of zero. Enriching events 
include exercises designed to promote teamwork and healthy watchstanding habits. Such 
events can consist of training with simulators, Bridge Resource Management (BRM), Basic 
Phase training, training from the Advanced Phase of the OFRP, such as Bridge Resource 
Management, or simulators. If a sailor doesn’t meet all the requirements listed for a specific 
level, they should be assigned the next highest value. As an example, if a sailor is part of 
the ship’s company, yet hasn’t attended any team-enriching exercises, they are assigned a 
risk value of one, as demonstrated by Table 11.  
Table 11. Watch team heuristic 
Watch Team Cohesion Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Relational Admin 
Temporary Assigned Duty  3 
Temporary Assigned Duty & requalified on current 
ship 
2 
Temporary Assigned Duty & requalified on current 
ship & participated in team enriching event with 
originating ship 
1 
Permanently Assigned Ships Crew & participated 
in a team enriching event with current ship’s crew 
0 
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3. Health Considerations  
The two remaining heuristics dedicated to assessing a sailor’s operational readiness 
are their physical readiness and their medical readiness. 
a. Physical Readiness  
A sailor’s overall Physical Fitness Assessment (PFA) is composed of both the PRT 
and the BCA. Prior to the PRT, an official BCA is administered. If a sailor meets the height 
and weight standards, they pass the BCA. However, if they fall outside of the height and 
weight parameters, they are subject to an Abdominal Circumference (AC) Measurement. 
Table 1 of the Body Composition Assessment Guide provides the thresholds for males and 
females depending on age (NPRP Guide 4, 2021). If they meet these standards from Table 
1, they pass the BCA. If they do not, they must then participate in the Body Circumference 
(BC) measurement. Members surpassing the tolerable body fat limits will fail the BCA and 
the overall PFA, despite their performance on the PRT (NPRP Guide 4, 2021). See Table 
12 for the Physical Readiness criteria for this heuristic.  
Table 12. Physical readiness heuristic 
Physical Readiness Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Physical Readiness Information 
Management System 
Failed: Scored Less than Probationary  
or failed the BCA 
2 
Passed: Scored Probationary  
and passed the BCA 
1 
Passed: Scored Satisfactory or Higher  
and passed the BCA 
0 
 
b. Medical Readiness  
In July 2017, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed the Office of Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) to lead the effort to 
deliver more “ready and lethal forces” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [OUSD], 
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2018, p. 105). It is plausible to suggest the incidents in 2017 served as a catalyst for this 
directive, as an attempt by the U.S. Navy to address the issue of continued reduced manning 
in the surface community. In April 2021, the USD Personnel and Readiness provided 
additional guidance regarding service member’s non-deployable status, as it relates to 
medical and dental readiness.  
Three medically related conditions may render a service member temporarily non-
deployable: (1) hospitalized but are expected to make a full recovery in less than 12 months, 
(2) health or medical conditions which extend beyond 30 days in duration, and (3) pregnant 
service members, including post-partum. Additionally, there are case-by-case situations in 
which a service member will be placed in a permanent non-deployable status (OUSD, 
2018). See Table 13. 
Table 13. Medical readiness heuristic  
Medical Readiness Risk Assessment 
Value Using: Individual Readiness Record 
Non-Deployable 2 
Deployable, degraded medical readiness 1 
Deployable, no degradations in medical readiness 0 
 
Once an individual is evaluated and assigned a value using each heuristic, the 
summation of those values aligns with a risk rating found in Table 14. Following the overall 
assessment, SMART can provide several different visuals from line plots, bar graphs, and 
various tables to present COs with a near-real-time snapshot of the operational readiness 
of their crew. In the following chapter, these new heuristics are built into SMART’s revised 




Table 14. Risk rating categories  






C. OUTPUTS  
SMART’s visualizations can be generated using any number of days available. 
However, for the demonstration below and the scenarios in the following chapter, three 
days of data are available for each sailor. Using these three days of data, a sailor’s overall 
cumulative score is determined by adding each day’s final score and dividing by the 
number of days. The results are demonstrated in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. Demonstration of 3-day breakdown  
From Figure 11, this sailor’s overall cumulative score for the previous three days 
is 9.3. Recall from Table 14, a score of 9.3 equates to a moderate risk rating, although a 
more precise measurement would be to examine each’s sailor’s performance within each 
heuristic over a series of three days. However, this type of data is assumed to be absent. 




This chapter describes the synthesized data and presents three scenarios in which 
SMART is leveraged to demonstrate its applicability in the surface community.  
A. NOTIONAL DATA  
To demonstrate and evaluate the functionality of this advanced SMART tool, 
notional data was generated to simulate the crew composition of an Arleigh Burke Class 
Destroyer. The data included 300 sailors (277 enlisted members and 23 officers) each 
assigned to 19 divisions among seven departments (Table 15). Figures 12 and 13 display 
the enlisted and officer organization for each department and division. Of note, a separate 
department was reserved for the CO, Executive Officer (XO), and Command Master Chief 
(CMC) titled “TRIAD”. 





Figure 12. Officer and enlisted breakdown summary by department 
  
Figure 13. Officer and enlisted breakdown summary by division 
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Table 16 displays the number of qualified watchstanders for each controlling watch 
station. Two factors should be considered when interpreting the information presented in 
Table 16. First, some sailors may be qualified for the duties of more than one watch station. 
As an example, to be qualified as an officer of the deck (OOD), one must first, among 
many other requirements, qualify as a conning officer (CONN) and junior officer of the 
deck (JOOD). The second consideration is that Table 16 refers to the number of qualified 
watchstanders that will most likely be assigned to stand the watch. For instance, although 
department heads are most likely qualified as a combat information center watch officer 
(CICWO), they infrequently stand this watch as a department head. As such, although they 
are previously qualified, they generally do not requalify nor are they assigned to stand 
watch in junior positions. More information regarding the basic functions of the watches 
described in Table 16 can be found in the Standard Organization and Regulations Manual 
(SORM) of the United States (Chief of Naval Operations, 2012).  
Table 16. Number of qualified watchstanders per watch station 
Watch station 
Number of  
Qualified Watchstanders 
Officer of the Deck (OOD) 6 
Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) 10 
Conning Officer (CONN) 12 
Navigator (NAV) 1 
Helm Safety 10 
Master Helmsman 4 
Lee Helmsman 4 
Aft Helm Safety 7 
Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 7 
Combat Information Center Watch Officer (CICWO) 8 
Piloting Officer 3 
Shipping Officer 4 
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Watch station 
Number of  
Qualified Watchstanders 
Surface/Sub-surface Warfare Coordinator (SUWC) 9 
Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC) 6 
Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) 6 
Propulsion and Auxiliary Control Console (PACC) 
Operator 
5 
Electrical Plant Control Console (EPCC) Operator 6 
 
B. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT & OUTPUT 
The following section describes the performance of SMART’s heuristics during 
three high-risk special evolutions: (1) Sea and Anchor (S&A), (2) Underway replenishment 
(UNREP) at sea, and (3) a strait transit. Sea and anchor details are generally stationed prior 
to entering or leaving a port. An UNREP is an evolution conducted at sea when (at least) 
two ships pull alongside each other and transfer fuel, supplies, ammunition, and personnel 
from one ship to another. Additionally, a strait transit involves departing a sea or large 
body of water to transit a narrow passage of water to arrive at another sea or large body of 
water. 
1. Sea & Anchor  
During this S&A detail, the ship is preparing to return to their homeport in Norfolk, 
VA. The ship has been underway for the last ten days conducting routine operations and 
unit-level training. This is the ship’s third underway since the completion of its 
maintenance phase. During this underway, the ship has ideal FIT and FILL levels, and most 
sailors are receiving adequate rest and are not experiencing elevated levels of fatigue. 
Figures 14 and 15 provide a snapshot of the sailor’s readiness for each department and 
division, respectively.  
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Figure 14. Overall Risk Rating by department for Scenario 1 
 
Figure 15. Overall Risk Rating by division for Scenario 1 
Table 17 captures the six sailors classified as moderate in scenario 1, all of which 
are identified as having elevated levels in the following heuristics: hours slept, hours 
awake, and sleep debt. Although the ship’s schedule facilitated conditions for their sailors 
to receive adequate rest, there may be underlying issues habitually preventing these sailors 
from receiving proper rest. These underlying issues could include personal issues making 
them restless, one of the factors discussed in Chapter II concerning disrupted sleep at sea, 
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or an undiagnosed sleep disorder. Regardless of the root causes, SMART was able to detect 
higher levels of fatigue among these sailors. Overall, the employment of circadian-based 
watchbills during this underway likely contributed to most sailors receiving adequate rest.  
Table 17. Sailors classified as moderate in Scenario 1 
Department Division Paygrades Rank/Rate Name Job Title Class 
CS CC E7 ITC Eric Church LCPO Enlisted 
CS CE CWO CWO3 Sturgill Simpson EMO Officer 
SUP S1 E8 LSCS Regis Philbin LCPO Enlisted 
SUP S2 E7 CSC Sue Kim LCPO Enlisted 
SUP S2 E6 CS1 Norman Cahners WCS Enlisted 
ENG ER E4 HT3 Travis Abbott n/a Enlisted 
 
2. UNREP  
In the days leading up to the underway replenishment at sea, the ship’s engineering 
department recently completed their Basic Phase certifications in Mobility Engineering 
(MOB-E) and Mobility Damage Control (MOB-D). To support these certifications, 
underway watch stations within the engineering department were reduced to three sections 
vice four sections and the engineering leadership employed a non-circadian watchbill. 
From Figure 16, it is evident that the ENG department is greatly affected compared to the 
other departments.  
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Figure 16. Overall Risk Rating by department for Scenario 2 
Taking a closer look at the divisions within the engineering department as shown 
in Figure 17, most sailors within those divisions are in the serious and critical risk 
categories. From here, division officers and leading chief petty officers (LCPO) of each 
division can further analyze which heuristics are affecting their sailors the most, and 
institute methods to mitigate or reduce these risks.  
 
Figure 17. Overall Risk Rating by engineering division for Scenario 2. 
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Using the information provided in Figures 16 and 17, on the day prior to the 
underway replenishment, the department head of the engineering department, known as the 
Chief Engineer (CHENG), is charged with assigning their personnel to engineering watch 
stations in preparation for the UNREP the following day. The Engineering Officer of the 
Watch (EOOW), Propulsion and Auxiliary Control Console (PACC) operator, the 
Electrical Plant Control Console (EPCC) operator, and the Lee Helmsman (Lee Helm) are 
four watch stations typically held by sailors in the engineering department. Figure 18 
displays a stacked bar graph of each risk category as it pertains to each watch station.   
 
Figure 18. Risk Rating by engineering watch station. 
From this figure, it can be observed that SMART’s algorithm has classified all six 
qualified EOOWs as either serious or critical risk ratings. The EOOW is typically the 
supervisory watch station overseeing the subordinate engineering watch stations. Having a 
sailor perform sub-optimally in this type of supervisory role threatens the safe and proper 
execution of the engineering equipment.  
3. Strait Transit  
This third and last scenario takes place in the Red Sea. The ship is currently pierside 
in Bahrain conducting its mid-deployment maintenance availability. This type of 
maintenance availability allows naval vessels to complete repairs while on deployment to 
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grant the ship the ability to remain fully mission capable throughout the remainder of the 
deployment. Although the availability was scheduled to be completed in two weeks, 
emergent tasking has required the ship to get underway in 48 hours. This notification means 
the ship’s crew and contractors need to work around the clock to put the ship back together 
and ensure it is ready to get underway. With 275 of 300 sailors onboard, the ship safely 
gets underway. The remaining crewmembers are required to stay behind and quarantine 
after many of them contracted the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV (COVID-19). Once out 
to sea, the ship’s emergent tasking includes assisting a guided missile cruiser with the task 
of escorting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier through the Strait of Hormuz the following 
afternoon. Prior to constructing the watchbill, the department heads met with the XO and 
SMART was used to determine the operational readiness of their sailors as they prepared 
for the strait transit. Figures 19 and 20 provide the risk rating for each department and 
division, respectively.  
 
Figure 19. Overall Risk Rating by department for Scenario 3 
50 
 
Figure 20. Overall Risk Rating by division for Scenario 3 
From Figures 19 and 20, it is evident that no one is in the minor risk category. 
Unlike scenario 2 where only one division is affected, this scenario presents a situation 
where the ship’s high OPTEMPO has placed some amount of strain on each of the 
departments and divisions. Based on Figure 21, the CO is faced with several decisions. 
 
Figure 21. Risk Rating by watch station for Scenario 3 
With only one watchstander in the moderate risk rating, an obvious question is 
whether this transit will be safe based on the readiness of the crew. Although every CO’s 
tolerance of risk differs, strait transits pose a great deal of risk, particularly the Strait of 
Hormuz which is a notoriously contested choke point. The CO and other key leaders have 
the discretion to decide whether to continue with the transit with certain mitigations in 
place or delay the transit to allow the readiness of their crew to improve. Fortunately, 
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SMART was able to present this data to its users in a manner that allowed them to make 
more informed decisions and exercise risk appropriately. 
In scenarios like these presented here, schedulers and key leaders should take into 
consideration the information produced by the SMART tool and seek methods and 
mitigations to reach their goal of having all sailors in the minor category and driving each 
sailor’s cumulative score to zero.  
C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the figures presented above, the Overall Risk Assessment distribution 
provides insight into potential trends among the risk rating categories. The main purpose 
of the Overall Risk Assessment Distribution, shown in Figure 22, is to provide insight as 
to where along the spectrum of each risk rating the sailor is positioned. For instance, in the 
previous scenarios, a user may understand how many sailors were in each category, yet 
they might not know whether they are escalating into the next category or de-escalating to 
a lesser category. We can see there are nine sailors in the upper tier of the minor risk rating 
possessing a cumulative score of nine. These sailors are potentially trending towards 
moderate. Additionally, we see there are seven sailors in the lesser end of serious, with a 
cumulative score of 13. 
 
Figure 22. Overall Risk Rating distribution 
A critical factor that is infrequently examined is the readiness of the CO, XO, or 
CMC. Figure 23 provides a snapshot of the operational readiness of the TRIAD over a 3-
day period. During special evolutions, the CO and XO are typically on the bridge to provide 
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additional oversight. However, if they, along with their sailors, are unsuitable and are 
operating in degraded levels of performance, this potentially fosters a mishap-prone 
environment, contributing to mission failure or even loss of life. 
 
Figure 23. CO, XO, and CMC’s operational readiness over a 3-day period 
When presented with information from SMART there are several approaches to 
consider, including: (1) working closely with the XO and the Operations Officer (OPS-O) 
to determine if there are any changes to the ship’s schedule that can be made that will grant 
sailors more opportunities to rest; (2) evaluating whether there are any watch stations, 
routine maintenance, or trainings that could be postponed during higher OPTEMPOs 
without jeopardizing the mission or the safety of the crew; and lastly (3) examining the 
likelihood of any prospective gains (PGs) arriving to the ship earlier than anticipated to 
reduce sailors’ workload.  
SMART does not aim to provide a solution to these types of situations presented in 
the form of the three previous scenarios. Instead, SMART brings the issue to the forefront 
of the leadership, to inform them of the operational readiness of their crew, particularly as 
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The overarching goal of this thesis is to provide COs and schedulers with a tool that 
allows them to visualize the readiness of their crew and to grant them the opportunity to 
reduce unnecessary risk and exercise more deliberate risk when needed. This thesis 
improved LT Badua’s prototype released in late 2020. Since the initial rollout in 2020, this 
thesis added substantial value to Badua’s tool by embedding ten refined heuristics, 
substantially reducing the need to manually enter data, and eliminating the need to rely on 
self-reported data.  
This section focuses on five areas: (1) the decision to use Excel, (2) the choice to 
use three days of data, (3) SMART’s adaptability to shore-based commands, (4) the 
selection of visualizations, and (5) the overall performance evaluation of SMART. 
Microsoft (MS) Excel was chosen as the ideal platform for SMART since it is widely 
available and accessible on most ships. Also, using Excel does not require its users to 
undergo extensive training precluding them from being onboard. Additionally, Excel can 
produce simple, and dynamic visualizations relatively easily.  
Three days of data is selected because it represented the fewest days of data needed 
to make an informed assessment of a sailor’s readiness. Having fewer days of data poses a 
challenge for COs and schedulers and makes it more difficult to recognize trends and gain 
insights associated with fatigue, experience and proficiency, and health readiness. Of 
course, having more days of data potentially provides a more accurate assessment of the 
crew’s readiness, and more insights could potentially be inferred from additional data.  
SMART was initially developed for use by the surface community; however, this 
tool could easily be adapted for shore commands. We recommend first introducing 
SMART with the newly devised ten heuristics. After several months, if sailors are routinely 
scoring zero in a particular heuristic or a group of heuristics, this could be a possible 
indication that this heuristic may need to be revised. For instance, if sailors at a particular 
shore command are participating in command Physical Training (PT), where sailors are 
working out several times a week and medical and dental facilities and appointments are 
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readily available, it may be determined that the heuristic developed to address health 
readiness is not needed.  
The visuals chosen in Chapter IV are representative of a small collection of the 
possible graphs and charts available. Excel contains a large variety of diagram types that 
can be tailored to the CO’s preferences. Again, to reinforce the decision to use Excel as the 
preferred platform, Excel’s ability to generate dynamic visuals with ease is unmatched.  
While determining the functional assessment of SMART, the assessment 
concentrates on evaluating the performance of the heuristics, instead of evaluating the 
performance of the software. In each of the three scenarios above, SMART is leveraged to 
determine how operationally ready the crew is in preparation for a special evolution. As 
previously discussed, SMART is not designed to breed recommendations for each sailor, 
yet SMART can inform the CO and leadership of degradations in performance their sailors 
may be experiencing.  
In conclusion, this thesis has contributed to the Scheduling Management Aid for 
Risk Tracking (SMART) tool. Using SMART, COs can systematically gauge human 
performance risk to enhance warfighter performance. Having the ability to assess human 
performance in a data-driven way increases COs’ decision space and enables them to 
properly manage risk while operating in a time-sensitive, high-risk environment as 
observed within the U.S. surface community. 
A. LIMITATIONS  
Perhaps the greatest limitation of this advanced SMART tool is its dependence on 
external systems for data. Although a significant improvement from the intensive manual 
labor required of the SMART prototype, this tool relies on the integration of several 
systems to receive its data. Most of the peripheral sources such as RADM, PRIMS, and 
MRRS already exist throughout the fleet. However, importing data from wearable 
technology may be challenging, mostly due to the limited prevalence of wearable 
technology in the surface fleet. As a steppingstone to overcome this challenge, data can be 
extracted from their original source, and manually imported into Excel. With the use of 
Excel macros, these data can be processed, and certain fields can be populated for use by 
SMART. This suggestion potentially makes the process semi-automated.  
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While the use of notional data aids in the development of the three scenarios in the 
previous chapter provides an avenue to exploit and demonstrate the capability of SMART, 
it lacks origination from the surface fleet. Additionally, the notional data assumes the ship 
is ideally manning regarding their FIT and FILL, and this is very seldom the case. 
Lastly, although the ten heuristics selected and modeled in SMART afford a more 
holistic perspective of a sailor’s level of readiness compared to the prototype version, they 
are not meant to serve as an exhaustive list. The criteria selected for each heuristic are a 
result of policies in the DOD and scientific research. It is likely, however, that not all facets 
of sailor performance impairments can be accounted for by the current set of heuristics. 
Further research is required to refine, expand, and reassess the utility of the heuristics used.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
We have identified three areas to continue the development of SMART: refine 
heuristics, develop a recommended watchbill generator, and test the tool in the operational 
environment. 
1. Refine Heuristics 
As previously described, the group of ten heuristics currently embedded in SMART 
can be augmented. In addition to the refinement of the heuristics, the total risk algorithm 
could be improved by assigning weights to each heuristic based on relative importance. 
For instance, if hours-awake are deemed twice as important as physical readiness, then 
hours-awake should be assigned a value of two. Depending on which criteria are met within 
the hours-awake heuristic, it would be a magnitude twice as great as the selected criteria 
for physical readiness. 
2. Recommended Watchbill Generator 
Incorporating a watchbill generator feature to this current version of SMART would 
pay large dividends. A watchbill generator that could provide watch station 
recommendations based on a sailor’s overall risk assessment would allow the CO to 
consider multiple different watchbill configurations based on the watchbill’s related risk 
level and operationally relevant restrictions. For instance, based on a predetermined weight 
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of importance, each watch station would be assigned a sailor with a particular risk rating. 
As an example, let’s consider the OOD is regarded as the most important watch station on 
a particular watchbill. The watchbill generator would prioritize that watch station and 
among the list of qualified OODs, the generator would assign the sailor with the lowest 
overall risk assessment. In contrast, sailors with the highest risk assessments could be 
assigned to the least important watch stations. 
3. Operational Testing 
The next major milestone for SMART is to be tested in the surface community 
using actual data from sailors. Testing this tool in the fleet will provide further insight in 
terms of the utility of the embedded heuristics and potentially identify any gaps among 
them. Once the tool has been evaluated and is further validated, user feedback should be 
solicited in order to further the progression of the tool.   
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